The most cutting criticism spoke to the Rorschach’s great selling point: that the results depended on who you were, not on how you were trving to present yourself. The Rorschach was an X-ray, the test that couldn't be faked any more than a slide could fool a slide projector. By 1960, though, studies were showing that examiners could consciously or unconsciously influence the results and that test takers modified their responses depending on why the test was being given, what the examiner thought of them, or just the examiner’s personal style. While some saw the interpersonal aspect of the test as part of its power, this did make the test less objective.
What psychological testers liked to call “clinical validity”—the fact that a skilled interpreter could use the Rorschach to gain insights that worked in practice and that could then be confirmed with the patient or checked against other sources—was starting to look very different to skeptics. They described these so-called insights as a combination of confirmation bias (overvaluing, even overperceiving, information one already agrees with), illusory correlations (deciding a connection exists that isn’t there), and the kinds of techniques used by fortune-tellers and psychics (unconsciously using contextual information, making statements true of almost everyone but felt to be insightful, offering “push” predictions subtly modified or even totally reversed in followup questions, and so on).
Blind diagnosis eliminated some of these issues but by no means all. The test still had to be administered by someone in contact with the test taker. Any verification of the diagnosis required checking it against the judgments of someone like the subject’s regular therapist, whic only replicated the problem. Besides, for psychological truths, it ) hard to say what outside confirmation could look like. Ifa clinician a patient both felt that a description of the patient was true, what e. was there? But these feelings would not satisfy a demand for hard proof.
Few claimed that Rorschach testers were consciously cynical frauds or quacks. Then again, a fortune-teller surrounded by customers amazed at the accuracy of his mind-reading might start to believe in his own astounding abilities, too—and some of the most forceful critics of the Rorschach drew just this analogy. At the very least, they ex pressed dismay at a “Rorschach culture” of orthodoxy, arguments from authority, and antiscientific bias.
Such criticisms, appearing in professional publications, had little effect on the Rorschach, which was in widespread use and central to che self-definition of clinical psychology. There was too great a demand for the access to the personality that the inkblots claimed to provide.
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The Cold War was running at its hottest in the sixties, demanding total ideological clarity in the battle between communism and capitalism, and there were moments when the fate of the world quite literally depended on how ambiguity was interpreted. In October 1962, President Kennedy was handed photographs of Cuba taken from America’s most advanced U-2 spy plane, which either did or didn’t show a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile launch site, and either were or weren't reason to start a nuclear war.
JFK saw “a football field” in one picture; RFK saw “the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house.” Even the deputy director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center—there was such a thing, established in 1961—admitted that the president would have to take “on faith” what the pictures showed. But what was needed was certainty. When JFK delivered a televised address to the nation on October 22, he called the photographs “unmistakable evidence” of aSoviet missile site; when they were reproduced around the world, the public found them just as unmistakable.
The combination of real ambiguity and an overwhelming need for Visual and ideological certainty produced what has been called a “Cold War crisis of images” affecting both sides of the Iron Curtain. Capitalists and communists alike went looking for secret messages behind tverything, and insisted they had found them. A new word for hiding specific meanings in material that seemed random and intentionless “encryption’—entered Webster's Dictionary in 1950. US Customs officials were confiscating abstract paintings sent from Paris because they thought the images contained communist messages. Ambiguities like the inkblots’ now tended to be thought of no longer as fruitful methods for exploring individual personalities but as codes to be deciphered,
Efforts to read minds were inseparable from attempts to control them—a link clearest in the research and debates on so-called “brain. washing” that rocked American behavioral sciences around the time of the Korean War. (These were the techniques immortalized in popular culture by The Manchurian Candidate: novel 1959; movie 1962.) The US government heavily promoted efforts to plumb the recesses of “the Soviet mind,” “the African mind,” “the non-European mind,” and so on, both in anthropology and more generally. It funded ventures like the Fulbright Fellowship, promoting cultural exchange and infiltration, and the creation of Area Studies (“Latin American” or “Far East” departments in prominent universities).
Psychology was seen as intrinsically linked to national security and the cause of democracy, and even outside of specific hotspots like Latin America or the Soviet mind, the inkblots were widely deployed to penetrate foreign psyches. Bleuler’s Moroccan farmers, Du Bois’s Alorese, and Hallowell’s Ojibwe had been just the beginning. Scholar Rebecca Lemov has counted five thousand articles published between 1941 and 1968 in what she calls the “Projective Test Movement”: research using Rorschachs and other projective methods on peoples from the Blackfoot Indians in the American West to every last Ifalukan living on coral islands in Micronesia totaling half a square mile. These studies, too, were well funded by the government. “Cold War-era look-insideyour-head fantasies flourished,” Lemov remarks.
In this technocratic context, the collected information was likely to end up as enormous stockpiles of data in archives and university libraries. The Vicos Collection at Cornell documented how the university leased a Peruvian village in 1952, expropriated it to the sharecroppers, and managed its transition into modernity, studying it and its inhabitants with projective tests every step of the way. The Microcard Publications of Primary Records in Culture and Personality in Wisconsin, known as the “database of dreams,” contained thousands of miniaturized Rorschach protocols and life histories, slices of life such as the
Rorschach responses of one hard drinking Mcnomince Indian from gortheastern Wisconsin who had run aground on the transition to mojecnity. Card VI, he said, “és dike a dead planet. It seems to tell the story of d pene onx great, who have lost... like something happened. All that's left is phe ambol.”
Another Menominee, a peyote worshipper, found the inkblots more comforting: “You know, this Rorschach. . . is something like peyote in , way. It looks into your mind. Sees the things that aren’t out in the open. It is like that with peyote. At a meeting you get to knowa man in , few hours better than you would get to know him in a lifetime otherwise. Everything about him is right there for you to see.”
Perhaps the low point of Cold War ambitions for psychology came when ARPA, the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, sent teams of psychologists into the war-torn jungles of Vietnam. They tested more than a thousand peasants with a modified TAT (uncaptioned pictures, redrawn from the Harvard originals by a Saigon artist), looking for the values, hopes, and frustrations that motivated them. They then met with military and civilian officials eager to “convert a war of devastation into a ‘welfare war’” that would bring “peace, democracy, and stability” to the region, and wanting to tailor their counterinsurgency propaganda to win over the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese. As one historian puts it: “The Vietnamese psyche was a crucial policy target.”
Simulmatics Corporation was a for-profit research company originally founded in 1959 to computer-simulate voter behavior before the 1960 presidential election. It had since branched out, and in 1966 it sent Walter H. Slote, a Columbia University lecturer and psychotherapist, to Saigon for seven weeks. His mission: uncover “the Vietnamese personality.” He believed that one life could reveal the forces that shape others—the “deeper” a single person’s motivation, “the more likely it is to represent universals”—and so he drew his conclusions from four people. After duly conceding that the sample was too small to generalize from, he generalized away.
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Precisely when Dr. Brokaw was taking his shirt to the people, the Rorschach was becoming a symbol in real life for anything that elicited different, equally valid opinions. In 1964, a reviewer confronted with ten books about New York summed up: “Composing a New York City book is a kind of projective psychological test, a Rorschach, say; the five boroughs are only a stimulus to which the observer responds according to his personality.” In the New York Times at least, this was the first of thousands of Rorschach clichés to come. Charles de Gaulle would soon be “a Rorschach test” for biographers; the loose plot ends of Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: .A Space Odyssey were a Rorschach test too.
In a culture-wide crisis of authority, it was easier for arbiters to stop claiming authority at all. Opinions differed, and calling something “a Rorschach test” meant there was no need to take a side and risk alienating anyone. Journalists and critics no longer saw it as their job to tell readers which possible reaction to New York City or 200z was correct: everyone had the right to their own opinion, and an inkblot was the indispensable metaphor for that freedom.
A resonant metaphor alone, though, would not have been enough to save the Rorschach as an actual psychological test. The fact had to be addressed that, by this point, there was no such thing as “the” Rorschach test at all.
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As early as 1964, four years after the term data science was coined, researchers had run the Rorschach responses of 586 healthy Johns Hopkins medical students through an early computer-indexing program and produced a 741-page large-format concordance. By the mid-1980s this corpus, plus the life histories available from long-term follow-ups with the test takers, made it possible to sidestep traditional Rorschach interpretation altogether. Computers simply counted up every occurrence of every word spoken in the tests and went looking for correlations between answers and later fates. An unnerving article from 1985, “Are Words of the Rorschach Predictors of Disease and Death?” claimed that those who mentioned “whirling” in any of the ten cards were five times as likely to commit suicide as those who didn’t, and four times as likely to have died of other causes. Exner brought computers into his own methodology as well. Beginning in the mid-1970s, he explored ways to “increase computer uti~ lization as an aid in interpreting the test,” eventually resulting in the 1968 survey of academic clinical psychologists, while showing that the Rorschach was still widely used, found that more than half the respon. dents felt that “objective,” “non projective” methods were increasing in use and importance. One of these methods, in particular, was rapidly gaining ground.
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI, fire published in 1943, pulled ahead of the Rorschach in 1975. It consisted og $04 statements—567 statements in the modified MMPI-2—that sub. jects were asked to agree or disagree with, ranging from the apparently trivial (“I have a good appetite”, “My hands and feet are usually warm enough”) to the obviously alarming (“Evil spirits possess me at times’, “I see things or animals or people around me that others do not see”), It could be administered to a group by a clerical worker and was easy to score. Each MMPI scale—the Depression Scale, the Paranoia Scale~ had two lists of question numbers associated with it: the number of items from the first list that had been answered True, plus the number from the second list marked False, was the result. It was quick and ix was “objective.”
Technically, this meant only that it was not “projective.” A person's True/False answer to “Some people think it’s hard to get to know me,” “1 have not lived the right kind of life,” or “A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct” could not be objective in any meaningful sense. People are not willing or able to evaluate themselves objectively—self-descriptions were often found to correspond only partially, at best, to what friends and family said about the test taker, or to what their behavior showed. Answers were not even meant to be taken at face value: Responding “True” to a lot of depressing statements and “False” to a lot of happy statements didn’t necessarily mean a person was depressed. There were scales to measure whether a person was likely to be exaggerating or lying; there were other ways one scale could affect the others. Interpreting MMPI results, too, was an art, requiring subjective judgment. But the slanted terms odjectsve and prejecttve certainly helped the MMPI’s fortunes.
In the decade after 1975, the Rorschach fell from being the second most commonly used personality test in clinical psychology to fifth. It was now behind both the MMPI and several other projective tests:
REN SZ en oP ont) Human Figure Drawing (used primarily with children), Sentence Completion, and the House-Tree-Person Test.
Results from these more limited tests were relatively self explanatory. Drawing a human figure with a big head might suggest arrogance. Leaving out key body parts was a bad sign. Completing sentences with hostile, pessimistic, or violent words: not good. These tests were thus more vulnerable to “impression management”—subjects could know how to stage the impression they wanted to make, present themselves as they wanted to be seen. One New York City cop, given the House-Iree-Person Test during his hiring process, said that his buddies had told him beforehand: “The house has to have a chimney with smoke coming out, and whatever you do, make sure you put leaves on the tree.” That’s what he did. Whatever their weaknesses, though, these tests were quick and cheap, and so increasingly preferred. Popularity rankings among tests, usually based on sporadic survevs with small and unrepresentative samples, are not as precise or reliable as they sound. But the trend lines were clear—the ink was on the wall.
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After all, over the course of a century spent looking at the inkblots, spent tallying, categorizing, and reframing what people see, everything you can imagine and quite a lot you can’t—one truth has remained unassailable: Card V looks like a bat. Or maybe a butterfly.
In Rorschach tests given between 2000 and 2007 to six hundred nonpatient Brazilian men and women, 370 of those people saw a bat in Card V; most of the others saw a butterfly or moth. There were, as usual, a lot of bears in Card II. In fact, out of roughly fourteen thousand total responses, there were only 6,459 different responses, and a small pool of thirty answers were common enough to be given by fifty or more people. The inkblots objectively do look like certain things, while they also invite interpretation. It wouldn’t be much of a test if everyone saw something totally different, or if almost everyone saw the same thing. In these six hundred tests, the long tail of personal variation consisted of about a thousand answers given by two people each, and fully 4,538 answers each given only once, including the “tragically misunderstood piece of cauliflower” seen by one depressed farmer.
If you graph the responses, the near vertical line on the Jeft shows he inkblots’ conrmon ground the obvious hats and bears while the horizontal line shows the lceway for personal idiosyncrasy. Meyer -alled this the Rorschach test’s structure and latitude. The graph alsa veils a More specific pattern: the most common answer is twice as <ommon as the second most frequent, three times as common as the chird most frequent, all the way down.
This is what’s known as a Zipf distribution, one of the mathematical ordering principles that structure the world. Other patterns are better known—the Fibonacci sequence in a nautilus shell, the bell curve of a random distribution—but the Zipf describes phenomena from earthquake size (there are very few huge ones and lots of little ones) to city populations, sizes of businesses, and word frequencies: in English “the” is twice as common as “of,” three times as common as “and,” on down to “cormorant” and “methylbenzamide.” Rorschach answers in a large sample will follow the same pattern. The bat on Card V is the “the” of the Rorschach.
A single test also yields more than one data point. A person typically gives twenty, thirty answers over the course of the test, and a healthy test result won't be stuck on either side of the Zipf curve. Only obvious answers would suggest you're pretty guarded or rigid, or uninterested in the task, or boring, while too many unusual or bizarre answers might mean you have a poor grip on reality, or mania, or maybe youre a rebel trying to be different.
Finally, the Rorschach yields multiple data points in a sequence. The test is a fixed series of ten cards, but test takers have the freedom to give multiple answers per card in any order. A given person's answers move up and down the Zipf curve, so to speak, a movement that itself has structure and latitude. Do your answers fall apart in the colored cards at the end of the test, or come together? Do you start with Something obvious on every card and then get quirky, or do you arrive at popular, common answers only gradually? [ven if two test takets Somehow gave exactly the same answers to each card, but in a different Order, maybe only one of them would have a rigid compulsion to give One kind of answer first and another last on every card, a pattern meaningful to a sensitive examiner.
Using nothing but intuition, artistic skill, trial and error, and a few ideas about the power of symmetry, Hermann Rorschach createy a set of pictures as inherently organized yet flexible as natural language or earthquakes. In this regard it is hard to imagine them bettereg_ psychologists have designed alternate series of inkblots over the yea, but all fell more or less quickly by the wayside. Rorschach’s inkblot, are like the act of seeing, which itself has both structure and latitude There’s something really there, but not anything that constrains y, completely. The visual nature of the world is objectively in thing, but we see it there; we subjectively impose our view of the world onty things, but only if that view fits what we see. We're all looking at the Same thing, even when we see it differently.
Rorschach’s blots are unique in more than shape. The colors elicit emotion, even override the shapes, sometimes but not always. Put. ting movement into a still image is not easy—it takes an artist with real skill and, in Rorschach’s words, “spatial rhythm” (like a Michelangelo, unlike a Futurist). It is even harder to potentially convey a sense of movement, to some people and not to others. Almost anyone will See movement in pictures like Rorschach’s man struggling with a can (page 97), but, as Rorschach wrote in 1919, “A key point is that the experiment is set up to make Movement responses difficult. If you show someone good pictures, then everyone, even the intellectually disabled, will seem to be a movement type.”
The symmetry of the blots, as Rorschach acknowledged, makes people see “disproportionately many butterflies etc.,” but he was also right that “the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.” The blots’ horizontal symmetry helps people connect with them, even identify with them. The blots are not mathematically symmetrical—they have variations in tiny protuberances, streaks, and shading—but neither are animals or people, which is precisely why the blots are seen as balanced and alive. In addition, since groups of people we encounter in real life are next to each other, not on top of each other, horizontal symmetry creates a “social” connection between the two sides of any image. It makes different parts of the inkblots interact, like pairs of people or other creatures. The inkblot test wouldn’t have worked without horizontal symmetry: the blots wouldn’t have been personal, psychological,